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4. Barzel Y. Measurement Costs and the organization of Markets // Journal of Law and Economics, 1982, 25(1), pp. 27 - 48.

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378 10. Klein B., K. B. Leffler. The role of market forces in assuring contractual performance // Journal of Political Economy 89 (No. 4, August 1981), pp. 615 - 641.

11. Kuzminov Y. Transition to a market economy and the problems of changing the economic culture // European Economy 49, 1991.

12. Macho-Stadler I., D. Perez-Castrillo. An Introduction to the economics of information, Incentives and Contracts, Oxford University Press, 1997.

13. McManus, J. C. The Cost of Alternative Economic Organizations // Canadian Journal of Economics, VIII, 1975, pp. 334 350.

14. Molho I. The economics of information (Lying and cheating in markets and organisations), Blackwell, 1997.

15. Mussa M., S. Rosen. Monopoly and product quality // Journal of Economic Theory 18, 1978, pp. 301 - 317.

16. Nelson P. Information and consumer behaviour // Journal of Political Economy, (No. 2, March/April 1970), pp. 311 - 329.

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